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ADMINISTRATORS’ KNOWLEDGE AND STATE
CONTROL IN COLONIAL ZIMBABWE:
THE INVENTION OF THE RURAL–URBAN
DIVIDE IN BUHERA DISTRICT, 1912–80
by jens a .andersson
Wageningen University
abstract : The power of the state to impose its self-produced categories of
thought poses a major problem to Zimbabwe historiography which has often taken
as unproblematic the relation between knowledge about, and control over, African
societies as presented in the state’s archives. This article challenges this hegemonic
view of the colonial state, presenting an alternative interpretation of administrative
reports on Buhera district. It shows how Buhera society became increasingly
represented as the traditional, rural end of a rural-urban divide in colonial policy
discourse, while, in reality, social life in the area became intimately linked to the
urban economy of Salisbury.
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Dr Holleman spoke well and clearly [to the African welfare workers], and not at
all in the patronizing way that is so common to white officials … ‘Now gentlemen,’
he said … and I could see how the listening Africans liked his politeness … ‘The
theme of my lecture, gentlemen, is the community. The African community. And
the basis of community, which is the tribe.’ And with this he drew on the
blackboard a circle – the tribe. ‘And the unit of the tribe is the kinship group.’ And
with that he divided his circle into neat portions – the kinship groups. ‘And what
gives the feeling of homogeneity in the village is the way these units are shaped.’
The Africans were listening very intently, and I was, too; for it was difficult for me
to see the tribe as a circle and the kinship groups as segments of it. Dr Holleman
was explaining how these units were broken into and scattered by the young men
going into the towns to work … ‘But [when] the fabric of the tribe is broken,
gentlemen, the fabric of the community is destroyed; and it is you who must
rebuild it’."
Doris Lessing’s brilliant irony brings out the theme of this paper, the role of
the state in colonial Zimbabwe.# Confident that they knew ‘African society’,$
white officials saw it as their task to guide it into the modern world. By
capturing it in symbols such as the ‘segmented circle’, they categorized
African social life into an intelligible and malleable social order. This power
of the state and its representatives to impose their self-produced categories
of thought% poses a major problem for the historiography of Zimbabwe,
" D. Lessing, Going Home (London, 1996), 151–3 (originally published in 1957).
# The research for this article was funded by the Netherlands Foundation for the
Advancement of Tropical Research (Wotro).
$ ‘African’ and ‘African society’ are, of course, highly problematic terms for they
homogenize numerous different peoples in and beyond Zimbabwe’s borders. In this
article they are used in a general sense, to denote the indigenous peoples of Zimbabwe.
% P. Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Cambridge, 1998), 35.
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which has long attributed to the state a dominant role in directing social
change. This is noticeable in the perspective of Holleman, as Doris Lessing
so clearly illustrates. Here the state features as an agent of modernization,
guiding Africans’ incorporation into an urbanized, industrial society.
Equally, a similar causality between policies and outcomes can be found in
more critical materialist analysis. For instance, historians like Arrighi,
Phimister and Palmer have perceived the Southern Rhodesian state as the
architect of an institutional framework which transformed African peasant
societies into exploited proletarians in a modern, class-based society.& Hence,
although representing opposing historiographical positions on the state, both
perspectives present a hegemonic view of the state that is often based on an
uncritical adoption of its categories of thought.
More recently, the hegemonic view of the state in colonial Africa has been
deflated by authors who have pointed to the conflicting interests within
colonial administrations, their limited resources and the contradictory
processes that shaped them.’ The present article, which also highlights the
limitations of the colonial state’s administrative capacity, does not, however,
focus on factionalism within the state apparatus. Instead it focuses on
administrators’ production of knowledge on African societies and its conse-
quences for state control over those societies. It may seem paradoxical to
challenge a hegemonic view of the colonial state and its categories of thought
with sources on an area that can be considered rather untypical of
Zimbabwe’s colonial history. For, unlike many other districts, Buhera
(Figure 1) was never the scene of large-scale land alienation and eviction of
Africans from their ancestral lands. As white settlers had little interest in its
dry and sandy soils, the area comprising present day Buhera was left to its
inhabitants and became known as the southern Sabi Native Reserve.(
Sources on this district-sized ‘native reserve’ are therefore largely limited to
the settler state’s records. Nevertheless, these records are of interest to
historical inquiry for two reasons. First, they allow for a different in-
terpretation of the usual role of state in development. At one level, it may be
seen that the reports of the administrators in Buhera district often merely
reflect the shifting biases in the state’s policies towards Africans, and the
& G. Arrighi, ‘Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study of the
proletarianisation of the African peasantry in Rhodesia’, and G. Arrighi, ‘The political
economy of Rhodesia ’, in G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul (eds.), Essays on the Political Economy
of Africa (Nairobi, 1973), 180–234, 336–77 ; I. Phimister, An Economic and Social History
of Zimbabwe, –: Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle (London, 1988) ; R. H.
Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia (London, 1977).
’ S. Berry, ‘Hegemony on a shoestring: indirect rule and access to agricultural land’,
Africa, 62 (1992), 328 ; B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya
and Africa (London, 1992).
( On the formation of African Reserves, see Palmer, Land, 57–60. Formed in 1895, the
Sabi district became part of the Charter district in 1899. In 1912, a, sub-station of the
Charter district office at The Range was opened at Buhera, in what was by then already
known as the Sabi Native Reserve: NC Charter annual report 1912, National Archives of
Zimbabwe (hereafter NAZ) N9}1}15 ; T. W. Baxter (ed.), Guide to the Public Archives of
Rhodesia, Vol. : – (Salisbury, 1969), 99. In 1943, the Sabi reserve was made a
full Native Commissioner’s district, and in 1945 the southern part became an independent
district, known as Buhera district : NC Buhera annual reports 1944 and 1945, NAZ,
S1563.
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Fig. 1. Buhera district, 2000.
subsequent categories of thought which these preoccupations elicited. Yet,
while following these biases in state policies, the analysis presented in this
paper will reveal that this archival material also contains observations from
local-level administrators which challenge the order and (illusion of) control
which these same administrators presented in their reports. Thus, the paper
aims to build an alternative interpretation that may stimulate the de-
velopment of alternative views on the impact of the settler state’s policies in
other areas.
Second, the case of Buhera district is of interest as a powerful image of
‘traditional African society’ was modelled on it in the 1950s. J. F. Holleman,
who selected the area for an anthropological inquiry in 1945, took the
inhabitants of Buhera as a people ‘whose traditional way of life had not yet
been profoundly influenced by regular contact with Western society’.) His
representation of Buhera as a traditional, closed rural society, was well-
attuned to the categories of thought of colonial policy discourse in the 1950s.
Preoccupied with agricultural modernisation and African urbanisation, the
settler state’s policies increasingly built upon a classification of African social
life in terms of a rural–urban dichotomy. Holleman’s book, Shona Customary
Law, which became influential in circles of the Southern Rhodesian adminis-
tration, represented Buhera social life along these lines – as the traditional,
rural side of this rural–urban divide. However, as the historical analysis
presented in this paper will reveal, this representation of Buhera district as
a traditional, closed rural society is incorrect. Already in the early colonial
period – and probably long before – the Buhera people were strongly in-
) J. F. Holleman, African Interlude (Cape Town, 1958), 1.
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corporated into wider networks of economic exchange. When, in the 1950s,
urban centres became increasingly important destinations for migrants
seeking work outside their home district, Buhera social life more and more
contradicted its representation as the rural end of a rural–urban divide.
Hence, this paper argues that the rural–urban divide constituted another
colonial invention of tradition,* albeit largely an imaginary one – situated in
the minds of colonial administrators and an anthropologist.
Building upon the historical analysis of Buhera district, the paper con-
cludes with an exploration of the hegemonic view of the colonial state in
Zimbabwean historiography. It suggests that the scholarly focus on areas
that experienced dramatic confrontations between European settlers and
administrators and Africans – areas for which sufficient and well-classified
archival material is available – goes a long way to explain why this dominant
role was attributed to the settler state."! However a focus on areas which were
more marginally incorporated into the colonial state may help us not only to
develop a more regionally differentiated view of the role of the colonial state,
but also enable us to look differently at African opposition to the colonial
state.
colonial administrators and the mobilisation of labour,
1898–1926
The early colonial history of Shona-speaking Zimbabwe has generally been
described as a period of peasant prosperity, preceding a decline in in-
dependent African farming. Colonization and the emerging white mining
industry led to an expansion of markets for both labour and agricultural
products such as grain and cattle. African societies actively responded to
these new market opportunities, which coincided with the state’s imposition
of taxes that forced people to generate a cash income."" A preoccupation with
labour mobilization, taxation and the systematic supply of forced labour to
white settlers’ mines and farms were the two prongs in the state’s policy
towards Africans. A common assumption in the historical analyses of this
period seems to be that Africans’ participation in markets for agricultural
produce and labour was mutually exclusive and followed one another
chronologically. As Palmer has put it, ‘it proved possible, and obviously
preferable, for the Shona to meet their tax commitments through the sale of
foodstuffs and cattle rather than by becoming migrant labourers ’."# From
1908 onwards, however, the state-subsidised expansion of European agri-
culture increased competition in agricultural markets, and independent
* T. Ranger, ‘The invention of tradition in colonial Africa’, in E. Hobsbawn and T.
Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983), 211–62 ; Ranger, ‘Migrants,
missionaries and the Manyika: the invention of ethnicity in Zimbabwe’, in L. Vail (ed.),
The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (London, 1989), 118–50.
"! For instance, while it was the absence of settler interference that made the area and
its peoples of interest to the anthropologist J. F. Holleman, the dearth of archival sources
for Buhera probably explains the limited interest in the area by archive-oriented
historians.
"" Phimister, ‘Peasant production and underdevelopment in Southern Rhodesia’,
African Affairs, 73(1974), 217–28 ; Palmer, ‘The agricultural history of Rhodesia’, in R.
Palmer and N. Parsons (eds.), The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa
(London, 1977), 221–54 ; Palmer, Land, 71–3. "# Ibid. 71.
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African farming is seen as entering an irreversible process of decline, in
which state intervention is perceived as having been a major force."$
Labour mobilization in Buhera sub-district
Based on the flawed assumption that colonialism and capitalism spread
simultaneously, the perspective on Zimbabwe’s early colonial history out-
lined above views African participation in labour markets as state-induced."%
However, Africans’ participation in labour markets was probably neither
new, nor much controlled by the small, newly-established administration."&
Letters of the Native Commissioner (NC) of Charter district show that even
before the turn of the century, inhabitants of the southern Sabi re-
serve – where there was no significant internal demand for labour – had
taken part in the movement of labour between districts. Although com-
pulsion may have played its part in mobilizing the Buherans, the NC Charter
was confident that the supply of African labour could also be generated by
means of taxation."’
Gaining control over Africans’ labour was also a major motivation for the
establishment of a sub-station in the remote southern part of Sabi native-
reserve."( And, like elsewhere, labour issues and taxation became recurrent
subjects in the reports of the Assistant Native Commissioner (ANC) Buhera,
whose sub-station was opened in 1912. Yet, the order presented in the
reports of successive administrators conceals both their limited under-
standing of, and control over, the Buhera peoples and their labour move-
ments.
As Figure 2 suggests, state control over the southern Sabi reserve was
limited in the early colonial period. Scattered water sources and the few
roads towards the south-eastern end of the sub-district seriously hampered
the surveillance of its inhabitants.") As a consequence, both collecting
"$ Phimister, Economic and Social History, 50 ; Palmer, Land, 71. A similar perspective
on the peasantry of South Africa has been developed in C. Bundy, The Rise and Fall of
the South African Peasantry (London, 1979).
"% As Wolf has argued, African societies were incorporated in wider networks of
economic exchange long before the colonial era: E. R. Wolf, Europe and the People without
History (Berkeley, 1982). Although beyond the scope of this paper, it is likely that Buhera
labour migration also preceded the establishment of settler control.
"& To be sure, with the establishment of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB)
in 1903, the colonial state institutionalized forced labour (chibaro). However, the impact
of this labour policy on local African societies was limited as the vast majority of the
African workers involved originated from outside Southern Rhodesia. For an analysis of
the function and operation of the RNLB and its forced labour, see C. van Onselen,
Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, – (London, 1976).
"’ NC Charter: letters 1898–1999, NAZ NSK 1}1}1. NC Charter report on 1900 and
1901, NAZ NSK 1}1}2.
"( ‘This would facilitate the work of the district and obviate long journeys for the
natives in connection with the [working] Pass and other regulations’, he argued. NC
Charter to CNC dd.5 Aug. 1909, NAZ N3}8}4. In 1912, an Assistant Native Com-
missioner (ANC) was appointed and stationed at a new sub-office at Buhera (see Figures
1 and 2). NC Charter annual report 1912, NAZ N9}1}15 ; Baxter, Guide, 99.
") See A. S. Cripps, The Sabi Reserve: A Southern Rhodesia Native Problem (Oxford,
1920), 29–33. This problem persisted even in the 1950s. ‘The Mwerihari is a big river and
during the rain it cannot be crossed for months on end. This means that a third of the
district is cut off from the station of Buhera for four to six months on end. This makes
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Fig. 2. Sketch map of Buhera sub-district, 1911. From Charter district :
letters and diary entries, 1896–1909, NAZ NSK 1}1}2.
revenue and establishing the number of men liable for tax must have been
difficult. Tax patrols were infrequent and could be evaded relatively easily,
enabling people to resist tax pressure for some time. Furthermore, village
headmen, who were responsible for tax collection, occupied an intermediary
position between their people and the administration. They could misreport
the number of men eligible for tax, the ones present or the tax due. Some
men may have managed to evade the tax system altogether, thus escaping
from the administration’s (and historians’) view. Rather than constituting an
attempt to meet one’s tax obligations, moving away from home may
sometimes have served to escape tax collection, as 1920s Annual Reports
reveal. Thus, in 1922 it was noted, ‘Arrear tax is mostly owed by those who
remain away at work. In many cases they remain undetected for years until
they lose their registration certificates’."* And again, in 1924, ‘Very often it
is reported that young men have gone out to work and subsequently it is
found that they are visiting or loafing in other parts [of the district]’.#!
Nevertheless, Buhera district reports of the early colonial period con-
consistent supervision of any development and administration in general, in the country
North of the Mwerihari river, impossible at the most important time of the year’. NC
Buhera annual report 1952, NAZ S2403}2681.
"* ANC Buhera annual report 1922, NAZ N9}1}25.
#! NC Charter annual report 1924, NAZ S235}502.
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Fig. 3. Mean monthly rainfall and working passes issued at Charter district
office and Buhera sub-office, 1910–16.
tinuously present ‘the necessity of paying tax … [as] about the only reason
why natives work’.#" However, this direct link between taxation and labour
migration is challenged by other observations of the same colonial adminis-
trators. They also noted that ‘[m]ost of those who took out [working] passes
went in search of work during the month of March’,## and that many
migrants ‘returned during October and November to plant their crops’
(Figure 3).#$ The resulting seasonal fluctuation in the labour supply suggests
that the labour-mobilizing capacity of the tax instrument was limited. Rather
than being a response to the state’s tax demands, the labour supply was a
function of changing labour demands in African agriculture.#%
Of course, African agriculture itself presented the major threat to the
presupposed relation between taxation and labour supply in colonial policy
discourse. As has been well documented in the literature, African farmers’
market production could easily generate the cash required for the payment
of tax.#& Nevertheless, in Buhera, labour migration already constituted an
#" ANC Buhera annual report 1922, NAZ N9}1}25.
## ANC Buhera annual report 1916, NAZ N9}1}19. Seasonal fluctuations in the labour
supply were common for Southern Rhodesia as a whole. See: CNC review of Sept. 1915,
NAZ N9}4}29.
#$ ANC Buhera annual report 1925, NAZ S235}503. See also ANC Buhera monthly
report Dec. 1915, NAZ N9}4}29. A similar perspective on workers’ motivations to seek
employment can be found in the then popular concept of the ‘target worker’. Based on the
prevailing idea that the more a worker is paid, the shorter he will work for a wage, this
concept portrayed African workers as irrational economic actors and was used to justify
a low-wage structure. See van Onselen, ‘Black workers in Central African industry: A
critical essay on the historiography and sociology of Rhodesia’, Journal of Southern
African Studies, 1 (1975), 237–8.
#% The 1910–14 figures for Charter district incorporate the working passes issued to
inhabitants of the Buhera sub-district. Mean monthly rainfall at Buhera was calculated on
the basis of rainfall figures for the period 1915–95, obtained from the Meteorological
Department, Harare. Working pass statistics originate from the NC Charter and ANC
Buhera monthly and annual reports 1910–1916, NAZ N9}4}23–31 and NAZ N9}1}19.
#& Palmer, ‘Agricultural history’ ; Phimister, ‘Peasant production’ ; Ranger, Peasant
Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study (London, 1985),
19–49 ; Ranger, Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture and History in the Matopos Hills
of Zimbabwe (Oxford, ) ; Arrighi, ‘Labour supplies’, 208.
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important element of peoples’ livelihoods in the early colonial period (and
probably before). But before exploring this, let us briefly consider the
administrators’ understanding and representation of Buhera’s involvement
in the migrant labour economy. Their reports, which present statistics on
working passes issued, suggest an understanding of, and control over, the
migration process that was largely non-existent. Other observations of
district administrators, scattered through their reports, can illuminate this.
First, the working pass statistics did not adequately reflect the number of
job-seekers involved, nor the length of their absence. Indeed, the adminis-
trators sometimes recognized that their own figures were largely an ad-
ministrative construct:
From a statistical point of view the figure of 469 [passes issued] may be
disregarded, as it does not give a true idea of the number of natives who left the
Reserve to work. They are not compelled to take out passes to seek work and many
go without them.#’
Still, unreliable or not, the working pass statistics featured in the adminis-
trators’ reports up to the mid 1920s.
A second problem with the statistical order presented in the Native
Commissioners’ reports is that these cannot cope with the complex ways in
which labour migration practices linked Buhera society to the wider
economy. Migrant workers’ adjusting their departure and return to the
agricultural calendar gives the false impression that they all belonged to a
single category of seasonal migrants. But, here again, other remarks in the
colonial reports allow for a different interpretation. For instance, the ANC
Buhera’s complaint of 1916 that ‘natives more or less in permanent
employment outside the Reserve … are among the worst tax payers’,
suggests that not all migrant workers returned home for the agricultural
season.#( Apparently, Buhera people were also involved in migration
practices which were other than seasonal. Reports from the early 1920s are
revealing in this respect. Besides seasonal migration to nearby labour centres,
they mention that numerous migrant workers were going further afield for
longer periods of time. Different patterns of labour migration could co-exist :
Some small proportion of the workers finds employment on the neighbouring
farms, a very large number wends its way to the larger labour centres of the country
and yet others travel South to the Northern parts of the Union of South
Africa … Many of this last category, initially at any rate, seem to engage
themselves through the medium of labour organisation as farm workers for a long
period at a wage rate of about 30}- a month.#)
This observed diversity in migration patterns is relevant for two reasons.
#’ ANC Buhera annual report 1916, NAZ N9}1}19. Similar remarks about the
inadequacy of these statistics can be found in ANC Buhera monthly report Sept. 1916,
NAZ N9}4}31 and the annual reports of the NC Charter, 1912–24. See NAZ N9}1}15–
22 ; NAZ S235}502.
#( ANC Buhera annual report 1916, NAZ N9}1}19. The Native Commissioner of
Charter district – of which Buhera was a sub-district – already writes about longer-term
labour migration before the ANC Buhera. Another indication of the importance of
longer-term migration from the area is the system of Tax Advice Forms (TAF) discussed
below.
#) The wages obtainable on Southern Rhodesian farms were, according to the ANC
Buhera, far lower. ANC Buhera annual report 1926, NAZ S235}504.
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First, it points to yet another weakness in the presupposed relation
between taxation and labour supply in colonial policy discourse. Colonial
state policy was unable to channel the movement of local African labourers.#*
Rather than regulating a national labour market, the Southern Rhodesian
state operated in the wider regional labour economy of Southern Africa.$!
Second, the observations of the ANC Buhera on the different migration
practices and knowledge of labour market migrants direct us to the role
played by migrant workers themselves. Rather than being subsumed under
state regulation, Buhera migrants were active participants in the labour
market, giving shape to different migration trajectories – differentiated ac-
cording to wages obtainable, distance from home and length of absence.
Labour migrants and Buhera livelihoods
If, as argued here, the colonial officials’ portrayal of tax-labour order
exaggerates state control over African labour, how must we understand
Buhera peoples’ involvement in labour migration? After all, to recall
Palmer’s argument, Africans preferred ‘to meet their tax obligations through
the sale of foodstuffs and cattle rather than by becoming migrant labourers’.$"
Yet, as the NC Charter observed in 1912, this was not merely an issue of
either or, but a combination of labour migration and agricultural production:
There is a gradual decrease in the number of natives going out to work. This may
be assigned to two reasons. (1) A large number remain in continuous service for
periods of 12 months and more and do not figure in the returns as having gone out.
(2) Many have earned sufficient to last them for some years to come. Others are
well off in stock and realize good prices.$#
For the inhabitants of Buhera sub-district, especially those in its remote and
dry south-eastern end, market production meant predominantly the sale of
cattle :
Tax is coming in exceptionally badly. The excuse put forward by the natives is
that buyers of stock – large and small – have not been so numerous as in previous
years … It is unfortunate the Chiefs Nyashano’s and Mambo’s districts are closed
to the exit of cattle [because of an outbreak of disease in a bordering district] as the
natives of these parts depend a lot on the sale of stock to secure their tax money.$$
The above remarks of the ANC Buhera suggest that changes in the cattle
market and veterinary restrictions on the movement of cattle from the area
influenced Buhera people’s income-generating capacity.$% Equally, it was
surely not always tax pressure that made people sell their cattle. In the
drought-prone southern Sabi reserve, cattle were primarily used as an
#* This inability to channel the labour supply is also evident in the recurrent labour
shortages within the Charter district in the 1910s and 1920s. The poor conditions of
service (wages) on European farms encouraged African workers to seek employment
further afield. NC Charter annual reports 1913, 1917, 1918, 1924, NAZ N9}1}16,
N9}1}20-21, S235}502.
$! B. Paton, Labour Export Policy in the Development of Southern Africa (Harare, 1995).
$" Palmer, Land, 71. $# NC Charter annual report 1912, NAZ N9}1}15.
$$ ANC Buhera monthly report Sept. 1915, NAZ N9}4}29, Vol.1.
$% A further explanation for the drop in cattle sales is that ‘prices offered are 40 to 50
percent below last year’ : NC Charter monthly report Sept. 1915, NAZ N9}4}29, Vol.1.
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insurance against recurrent food shortages.$& Trading cattle for grain and
cash was, in fact, a rather common business in Buhera sub-district. Besides
supplying European traders, African farmers from the better-watered
north-western part of the sub-district supplied grain to the south-eastern
end where recurrent crop failure had made people specialize in cattle
production. John Iliffe has related these crop failures to the colonial state’s
segregationist land policies that concentrated Africans in reserves and
pressed them into marginal areas such as:
The lower eastern section of Buhera whose administrator reported in 1918
that … ‘although acreage cultivated increases, there has never been sufficient food
produced to carry the population from season to season for the past three years.$’
However, until the 1920s, the colonial state’s land policies probably neither
caused, nor, aggravated food shortages in Buhera, as forced population
movements into the sub-district were small.$( Rather than forced immi-
grations, the observed increase in cultivated area resulted from the expansion
of plough agriculture, enabling farmers to cultivate larger fields. The
southern Sabi reserve had long been occupied, its lowveld being the centre
of Hera dynastic power long before the establishment of European rule.$)
Crop failure was a recurrent feature in Buhera, but selling or bartering stock
for grain could usually mitigate grain shortages. For those without a herd,
labour migration provided the means to build one. Hence, rather than being
a Pavlov-like reaction to the colonial state’s tax demands, the Buhera labour
supply was probably more dependant on herd sizes, stock being the major
source of wealth. The ANC Buhera once recognized this relation:
It is anticipated an increased number of natives will be forced out to work during
the coming year owing to the loss of their accumulated wealth during the past
drought which was used up to keep themselves and families in food.$*
Once a substantial herd was built up, the occasional sale of stock could raise
the imposed taxes and supplement the relatively small cash incomes obtained
from crop sales. Obviously, not everybody could regularly sell a beast and,
besides its monetary value, keeping stock was also significant in other spheres
of social life. Young men of marriageable age, in particular, had to build up
a herd, both for bridewealth (roora) payments and farming purposes. Hence,
engaging in migrant labour was not just – as Palmer seems to suggest – a last
resort of peasant producers’ whose crop production or marketing efforts had
failed. Labour migration could be a deliberate strategy to accumulate wealth.
It formed an integral part of the career of many Buhera men, as the following
observation of the ANC Buhera reveals :
$& For instance, during the 1916 drought Buhera stock owners bartered away some
2,480 cattle to European traders alone, receiving 5,000–6,000 bags of grain in return: J.
Iliffe, Famine in Zimbabwe, – (Gweru, 1990), 60. In total, the administration
permitted the removal of some 8,000 cattle from the sub-district. ANC Buhera annual
report 1916, NAZ N9}1}19. $’ Iliffe, Famine, 62.
$( Few Africans were evicted in the Charter district as ‘since the financial position is
becoming acute, the large landowners who were inclined to oust the natives from their
Estates, are now encouraging them to remain and settle so as to benefit by collecting as
much rent as possible’. NC Charter annual report 1915, NAZ N9}1}18.
$) D. N. Beach, A Zimbabwean Past: Shona Dynastic Histories and Oral Traditions
(Gweru, 1994), 36–43. $* ANC Buhera annual report 1916, NAZ N9}1}19.
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A very considerable proportion of the able bodied male population has been
away at work during the year. Some opportunity of testing the accuracy of such a
statement was afforded by the collection of the population at different centres for
vaccination purposes … 13,500 people were gathered together in October, amongst
this number an able bodied young man of working age was very rarely noticed.
During November a further 6,000 people were assembled, amongst this number
was a higher but still remarkably small proportion of young men of working age;
the increase in proportion observed during November may have had some
connection with the fall of early rains and an influx of workers returning home.%!
To conclude, in the early colonial period, and conceivably long before,
Buhera livelihoods were already strongly incorporated into markets for
labour and agricultural produce (grain and cattle). This market incorporation
was probably not matched by an equal incorporation into the colonial state.
Despite the major preoccupation with African labour in colonial policy
discourse and the controlled social order which officials presented in their
reports, the archival sources also allow for another interpretation. Obser-
vations suggesting that the state impinged very little on social life in Buhera
can equally be found in these sources. Rather than being purely state-
induced, Buherans’ participation in the labour market may also be under-
stood in relation to their other livelihood practices – crop and stock pro-
duction. Recurrent droughts, particularly affecting the south-eastern end of
the sub-district regularly depleted its inhabitants of their wealth, turning
(temporal) wage labour into another option to sustain their livelihood.
from labour to produce markets : the state and african
agriculture, 1926–39
Moving on from a preoccupation with the mobilization of African labour,
colonial state policies in the 1920s and 1930s witnessed a growing interest in
African agriculture. Marked by the appointment of E. D. Alvord as Agri-
culturist for the Instruction of Natives in 1926, African farming became the
object of government planning. Nevertheless, in Zimbabwean historiography
the 1920s and 1930s have been regarded as the stage of the ‘dominant theme
of Rhodesian agricultural history’, which Palmer has typified as ‘the triumph
of European over African farmers’.%" Labour mobilization policies, unable to
curb independent African farming in the early colonial period, were
‘increasingly supplemented by attacks on African land holdings and par-
ticipation in produce markets’.%# These ‘attacks’ were closely linked to the
emergence of a – heavily state-subsidized – white farming sector which felt
increasingly threatened by African producers’ competitiveness. Aided by the
crisis of the 1930s which decreased agricultural prices, these state policies
have often been regarded as effecting the collapse of independent African
peasant farming in the 1930s. From the 1930s onwards, Arrighi has
maintained, a situation of ‘unlimited supplies’ of African labour prevailed,
removing the need for extra-market forces – that is, state intervention – to
generate a labour supply.%$
%! ANC Buhera annual report 1927, NAZ S235}505.
%" Palmer, ‘Agricultural history’, 221.
%# Phimister, Economic and Social History, 47. %$ Arrighi, ‘Labour supplies’, 226.
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Although the crisis in African agriculture is widely accepted in
Zimbabwean historiography, the ‘de-peasantization’ thesis has also been
challenged.%% Ranger, for instance, found that although ‘peasants of all sorts
became more aware of the role of the state’%& during the 1930s, by the end of
the decade ‘African agriculture had survived everywhere’.%’ Hence, the
1930s crisis in African agriculture did not mark the completion of a process
of proletarianization of African peasant farmers. While focusing on peasant
resistance, Ranger thus started to question the dominant role attributed to
the colonial state by scholars of political economy schools of thought.
Nevertheless, the 1930s did witness an increased state control over Africans’
participation in both the labour and produce markets. In the labour market,
this extended control has gone largely unnoticed in the academic literature.
Yet, the system of Tax Advice Forms (TAF) enhanced colonial adminis-
trators’ understanding and control over labour movements as well as the
state’s capacity to raise tax from Africans working outside their home
district.%(
The growing attention to African farming in colonial policy discourse was
equivocal. On the one hand, state intervention attempted to enhance
Africans’ agricultural practices, but simultaneously sought deliberately to
undercut African competitiveness in agricultural produce markets in an
attempt to protect the interests of white settler farmers.%) Two lines of
policies can be distinguished in this latter strand. First, the operation of these
markets was manipulated. The effect of policies such as the Maize Control
and Cattle Levy Acts was that Africans farmers received lower prices than
did their white colleagues. Second, segregationist policies undermined
African farmers’ ability to produce for markets. The enforcement of the 1930
Land Apportionment Act led to a further removal of Africans from alienated
land and squeezed them together in the reserves. Increased population
pressure on land in these areas undercut individual farmers’ productive
capacity and caused concern within the colonial administration over the
carrying capacity of the reserves.
%% W. Do$ pcke, Das Koloniale Zimbabwe in der Krise: Eine Wirtschafts- und Sozial-
geschichte – (Mu$ nster, 1989), 173–94. P. Mosley, The Settler Economies: Studies
in the Economic History of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, – (Cambridge, 1983),
71.
%& Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, 84.
%’ Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, 78. In addition, Johnson has challenged Arrighi’s
thesis of unlimited supplies of labour, arguing that even after the 1930s, ‘extra-economic
forms of coercion remained of critical importance in securing large supplies of labour in
Southern Rhodesia’ : D. Johnson, ‘Settler farmers and coerced African Labour in
Southern Rhodesia, 1936–46’, Journal of African History, 33 (1992), 112.
%( Tax Advice Forms (TAF) were first used in 1924. They enabled the collection of tax
from migrant workers in the district of employment rather than that of origin. Thus, local
administrators could keep track of tax-paying inhabitants of their district and the major
destinations of their migrant labour force.
%) The settler state’s interference with irrigation schemes in African areas is a good
example of this double-edged attitude towards African agriculture: E. Manzungu,
‘Engineering or domineering? The politics of water control in Mutambara irrigation
scheme, Zimbabwe’, Zambezia 22 (1995), 115–36.
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Fig. 4. Percentage of tax collected by means of Tax Advice Forms (TAF),
and percentage collected of total tax due: Buhera sub-district, 1925–45.
Economic depression, market regulation and veterinary measures in Buhera
Segregationist policies and state regulation of cattle and maize markets were
also important forces in Buhera. It is, however, difficult to isolate the impact
of these measures from the wider impact of the economic crisis of the early
1930s. As in other African areas, declining prices for agricultural produce
and a contracting labour market constrained Buherans’ capacity to generate
cash income. Certainly, the colonial state’s policies deepened the crisis in
produce markets. The Maize Control Act of 1931%* institutionalized sales to
maize depots in white farming areas, increasing transport costs for maize
produced in the reserves.&! Lower prices for African maize producers were
the result, but in Buhera it was chiefly the northern part which was affected.
Maize was not widely grown in the early 1930s, for ‘the bulk of the growers
reside within a short radius of the Store in the Narira Reserve’.&"
Similarly, the Cattle Levy Acts of 1931 and 1934 further reduced the
already low prices on the cattle market and ‘[n]atives were disinclined to sell
at the low prices offered’.&# Hence, the Buhera population faced difficult
times, particularly as the 1930s also witnessed a serious drought. Cash was
particularly scarce, and even the state’s tax revenue suffered from the
depressed markets; its own policies were hampering market production. The
actual tax collected as a share of the ANC’s projected revenue decreased, only
to reach pre-1930 levels again in the early 1940s (Figure 4).
%* The Maize Control Act of 1931 was amended several times during the 1930s. See
C. F. Keyter, Maize Control in Southern Rhodesia –: The African Contribution
to White Survival (Salisbury, 1978) ; Do$ pcke, Das Koloniale Zimbabwe in der Krise,
265–75.
&! The ANC Buhera annual report of 1934 commented: ‘It is difficult to arrive at any
estimate as to the amount of maize grown but what surplus there might have been was
unmarketable owing to transport costs. Dissatisfied with the law traders were in any case
unwilling to buy. ’ NAZ S1563.
&" ANC Buhera annual report 1932, NAZ S235}510. In Southern Buhera the main
grain crops were fingermillet (rukweza or rapoko) and bulrush millet (mhunga).
&# ANC Buhera annual report 1932, NAZ S235}510.
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Yet, it was the state’s veterinary measures, rather than its interventions in
maize and cattle markets, that deepened the impact of the 1930s crisis.
Quarantine measures following outbreaks of disease regularly meant that
cattle owners could not sell stock outside the district. Such measures even
affected tax collections:
The unfortunate drop in tax collection is directly traceable to the position
created by restriction on cattle movements consequent on the Foot and Mouth
disease, aggravated by the state of famine which handicapped the greater portion
of Nyashano’s people [of south-eastern Buhera sub-district].&$
There is no doubt that the veterinary measures imposed were not, as a rule,
the result of disease outbreaks in areas without cattle dip-tanks. Cattle in the
non-dipping zone of the southern Sabi reserve were generally free from ticks
and diseases, but subject to restricted movement for fear of disease spread-
ing.&% The establishment of cattle dip-tanks in the area may, therefore, be
understood primarily as a ‘technology of control’, enabling greater state
surveillance over the cattle sector through stock counts, the organization of
sales and the collection of dip fees.&& Although a large part of the sub-district
was not covered by dip tanks, which casts doubt on the reliability of stock
figures presented in colonial records,&’ state control over stock sales to buyers
from outside the sub-district was probably substantial. Hence, it was mainly
through veterinary measures that the state exercized control over the cattle-
oriented economy of the Buhera sub-district. Although initially not designed
as an instrument to undercut African peasant production, it was these
measures of the colonial state that most affected the crisis-struck Buhera
economy. The ANC Buhera in his report of September 1938 summarized the
situation:
It is hoped that some relaxation of the restrictions on the movement of cattle
from the non-dipping area will ensue. It is difficult to understand why an area
which is and always has been free from disease should be penalised by such
restrictions as have been imposed for the past two or three years.&(
Various responses to the 1930s crisis can be noticed in Buhera’s colonial
records. For instance, the state’s veterinary measures probably caused intra-
district trade to gain in significance. Such trade may well have become
increasingly demonetized, as the colonial reports suggest. Cattle from the
drought-prone south-eastern end of the Sabi reserve were bartered with the
&$ ANC Buhera, annual report 1931, NAZ S235}509.
&% Disease outbreaks were confined to the northern part of the sub-district, where cattle
dip-tanks were erected from 1926 onwards. In the non-dipping area in the southern part,
cattle always were ‘remarkably free from ticks and disease’, as the NC Buhera remarked
in 1945. Nevertheless, ‘the chief veterinary surgeon [was] keen on this area being put
under dipping’ : NC Buhera annual report 1945, NAZ S1563.
&& The system of cattle regulations and dip fees probably was the state’s most effective
instrument of control in the 1930s. An example of its use is the forced labour imposed
upon registered cattle owners in the Charter district. See Cripps, How Roads Were Cut
in the Native Reserves of Charter District, Mashonaland – (London, 1936), 7.
&’ The ANC Buhera acknowledges the problem of counting stock in the non-dipping
areas, as is evidenced by his letter to his superior in which he explains the differences
between the stock estimates for 1931 and 1932 : NC Buhera to NC Charter, 6 Jan. 1932,
NAZ S138}1. &( ANC Buhera monthly report Sept. 1938, NAZ S1619.
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grain-producing northern parts.&) Simultaneously, the scanty evidence on
crop sales in the ANC Buhera reports suggests a shift in cash-crop
production. Whereas the market production of maize in the northern part of
the Sabi reserve and the Narira reserve declined during in the early 1930s,
sales of groundnuts increased. This adaptability of the Buhera people to
changing market situations is also apparent from the Assistant Native
Commissioner’s Tax Register. After 1931, the share of tax forwarded to the
ANC Buhera by Africans working in other districts increased (Figure 4).&*
This suggests that income earned by longer-term migrants was becoming
more important in sustaining Buhera livelihoods.’!
To summarize, Buhera livelihoods, consisting of various combinations of
cash crop, commercial stock production and labour migration, went through
a period of adjustment in the early 1930s. The relative importance of these
different livelihood practices altered, and the composition of marketed crops
altered. The problems of marketing did not simply result in decline: stock
numbers increased substantially in this period.’" When cattle prices tem-
porarily picked up and restrictions on cattle movements were lifted, cattle
owners responded quickly. Furthermore, towards the end of the 1930s, the
economic situation improved. In the early 1940s, when cattle prices rose
more substantially and cattle marketing was re-organized, sales improved.’#
Crop marketing improved as well, albeit not the sale of maize. ‘This, I think,
is due partly to the poor rainy season for maize and partly for the low price
of maize compared with other produce of the land’, the ANC Buhera
reported in 1942.’$
Colonial land use policies in Buhera
Besides policies which sought to diminish African competition in produce
markets, the 1920s and 1930s simultaneously witnessed a growing interest on
the part of the colonial state in African land use. In order to absorb those
displaced by the Land Apportionment Act, it was felt that the carrying
capacity of the reserves needed to be increased. Consequently, the colonial
state sought to intensify African land use. This, as previously mentioned,
resulted in the appointment of E. D. Alvord, who promoted intensified
&) Possibly other animal products also became more important cash earners. In the
early 1930s sales of sheep and fowl were noted: ANC Buhera annual reports 1932–4, NAZ
S235}510-511, and S1563.
&* NC Charter and ANC Buhera annual reports 1927–45, NAZ S235}505–518 ; S1563 ;
S1051.
’! The reports of the 1930s do not mention an increasing rate of male absenteeism in
Buhera. This may, of course, relate to the ANC Buhera’s deficient observations on labour
migration. Both oral and archival sources do, however, indicate that in the 1930s
migrations of Buhera men to South Africa were common.
’" The estimated number of cattle almost doubled, from 30,812 in 1931 to 60,978 in
1942 : ANC Buhera annual reports 1931 and 1942, NAZ S235}509 and S1563.
’# Buhera cattle sales possibly also benefited from the installation of weigh bridges at
cattle sale pens: ANC Buhera to NC Charter on slaughter cattle price order GN 18}42,
15 Jan. 1942. The number of cattle sold rose from 1,560 in 1940 to 2,681 in 1942. The
ANC Buhera concluded, ‘there is no ground for the belief … that among natives, the
higher the price of cattle the fewer do they sell’ : ANC Buhera annual report 1942, NAZ
S1563. ’$ Ibid.
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agriculture through an agricultural extension programme and land use
policies such as ‘centralization’ – the reorganization of land in consolidated
grazing and arable blocks, with a line of residential sites in between.’% This
state interference with African land use was, however, not motivated by
solely segregationist considerations, for the concern for the ‘carrying ca-
pacity’ of the African reserves was simultaneously informed by an emerging
ideology of conservation within the colonial administration. Hence, when the
settler state started to extend its control over Africans’ land-use practices it
was, from the beginning, tied up with, and justified by, a discourse of
conservation.’&
In the Buhera sub-district as well, conservationist concerns ran parallel
with an idea of intensifying land use. As in other African reserves, population
growth and an influx of evicted people increased the pressure on land,’’
especially in the better-watered north-western part of the sub-district. This
area, the ANC Buhera reported in 1936, was ‘becoming thickly populated’
and so:
The time is not far distant when it will be necessary for the preservation of the
fertility of the soil to insist on the more economical use of it, and when it will be
no longer possible to study the wishes of the people if they are opposed to better
methods of agriculture.’(
The Buhera peoples, who opposed the idea of demonstrators (and
centralization), were confronted with the first agricultural demonstrator two
years later. Simultaneously, a start was made with centralization in a small
part of the sub-district. Yet, by 1942, the demonstrator only had 25 co-
operating farmers, and the enforcement of centralization proved prob-
lematic.’) Up to the mid-1940s the impact of these land-use policies was
actually minimal.
In the drought-prone southern part of the sub-district, colonial state
intervention had an equally limited influence on existing land-use practices
during the 1930s. In this sparsely populated area, where settlement was
concentrated around water sources, the common agricultural practice of
shifting cultivation remained unaltered. Hence, the carrying-capacity-
minded administrators did not include Buhera in their growing list of
’% For an overview of the extension programme, see J. A. Bolding, ‘Alvord and the
demonstration concept: origins and consequences of the agricultural demonstrator
scheme, 1920–1944’, in J. Mutimba, J. A. Bolding and P. van der Zaag (eds.),
Interventions in Smallholder Agriculture: Implications for Agricultural Extension in
Zimbabwe (Harare, forthcoming).
’& W. Beinart, ‘Soil erosion, conservationism and ideas about development: a Southern
African exploration, 1900–1960’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 11 (1984), 53 ;
‘Introduction: the politics of colonial conservation’, Journal of Southern African Studies,
15 (1989), 153.
’’ In the early 1930s, more than 1,000 people moved into the Buhera area. ANC Buhera
annual reports 1932 and 1934, NAZ 235}510 and S1563.
’( ANC Buhera to NC Charter, on ‘Survey of Sabi Reserve’, 28 Oct. 1936. NAZ
S1542 A4 Vol. 4.
’) Correspondence on appointment of agricultural demonstrators and centralization
Sabi Reserve 1934–38, NAZ S1542}D7 ; ANC Buhera monthly reports May, Sept., Oct.
1938, NAZ S1619 ; ANC Buhera annual report 1942, NAZ S1563 ; ANC Buhera to NC
Charter on ‘Natural Resources Act’, 26 Jan. 1942, NAZ S2806}1958.
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overpopulated and overstocked African reserves.’* Nevertheless, a modest
start was made with the development of water supplies in the dry south in the
late 1930s, the need for this being increased by reason of an anticipated
further influx of Africans into the area. On the whole, however, the growing
preoccupation with African land use in colonial policy discourse had
virtually no impact on land use in Buhera sub-district during the 1930s.
To conclude, the situation in which the Buhera people found themselves
at the beginning of the 1930s was indeed serious. Both market production
and labour market participation were becoming difficult as a result of
declining producer prices, labour demand and wages. State intervention in
markets aggravated the situation, but it was primarily veterinary policies
which deepened the crisis in Buhera livelihoods. Yet, as Ranger has argued,
it was not an irreversible process of decline in African agriculture. By the late
1930s, the situation had already improved, and the share of income generated
by labour migration to other districts had decreased.(! The labour–land–
cattle–based economy of Buhera, capable of withstanding the colonial state’s
interventions in produce markets during the 1930s, had adjusted itself. By
the mid-1940s the prosperity of the rural economy surprised the ANC
Buhera, who commented, ‘a considerable amount of grain is traded in the
district. It is remarkable that the figure is so high when average distance to
railhead is in the region of 70 miles’.("
planned modernization : the colonial state and the
rural-urban divide, 1940–61
While the 1930s have been regarded in Zimbabwean historiography as the
epoch of triumph of European over African farming, the 1940s and 1950s can
be seen as the height of planned modernization. Government planning, seen
as the vehicle of African modernization, was greatly intensified, but also met
with greater opposition from African nationalists. Not surprisingly, then,
growing African resistance to state planning in this period has attracted
considerable attention in Zimbabwean historiography. However, with the
growing attention to African opposition to the colonial state, there has also
been a tendency to shift the focus from rural to urban areas, where organized
opposition to the colonial state took shape from the 1930s onwards.(# A
notable exception in the literature is Ranger, who has continued to draw
’* ANC Buhera to NC Buhera on overstocking circular no. 29, 3 June 1942, NAZ
S2384}7. It was 1952 before ‘the district was declared an ‘‘overstocked’’ area in terms of
the Natural Resources Act’ : NC Buhera annual report 1952, NAZ S2403}2681.
(! This does not mean that migrant incomes became less important, as considerable
numbers of Buhera migrants sought employment in the Union of South Africa in the
1930s.
(" NC Buhera annual report 1945, NAZ S1563. The most important crops sold were
groundnuts and millet.
(# J. van Velsen, ‘Trends in African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia ’, Kroniek van
Afrika, 4 (1964), 139–57 ; P. Harris, ‘Industrial workers in Rhodesia, 1946–1972 : working
class elites or lumpen-proletariat?’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 1 (1974), 139–61 ;
B. Raftopoulos, ‘Nationalism and labour in Salisbury, 1953–1965’, Journal of Southern
African Studies, 21 (1995), 79–93 ; T. Barnes, ‘‘So that a labourer could live with his
family’’ : Overlooked factors in social and economic strife in urban colonial Zimbabwe,
1945–1952’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 21 (1995), 95–113.
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attention to African rural areas in the post-Second World War period
through his argument that state intervention in the African rural areas caused
an agricultural crisis in the reserves in the 1940s.($ Ranger sees the loss of
land in the 1950s – caused by further evictions from alienated lands and
the Native Land Husbandry Act – as fuelling the peasant radicalism that
shaped the rural support for the liberation struggle in the 1970s.(%
While state intervention in African land use had already increased in many
areas during the 1930s, with the implementation of the 1940 Land Ap-
portionment Act and the Natural Resources Act of 1941 this involvement
was further expanded. As a consequence of the former act, the reserves in the
Shona-speaking areas had to absorb another influx of Africans evicted from
alienated lands. At the same time, farming in the reserves became further
restricted by the state’s conservationist concerns laid down in the Natural
Resources Act. The colonial state’s attempt to re-organize African agri-
culture culminated in the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 1951,
generally regarded as the most ambitious and far-reaching rural intervention
programme of the colonial period. Yet, confidence in state planning in the
1940s and 1950s did not confine itself to African rural areas. The rapidly
expanding urban economy in post-war Southern Rhodesia spurred on the
settler state to develop more comprehensive policies for African urban areas.
The resulting emergence of a rural-urban divide in colonial policy discourse
led, as reflected by Zimbabwean historiography, to African urban and rural
social settings being increasingly treated separately, as two distinct objects of
administrators’ modernizing efforts.
The rural–urban divide and the emergence of Buhera as a farming society
The emergence of a rural–urban divide in colonial policy discourse is also
noticeable in the reports of the NC Buhera. Remarks on oscillating labour
migration gradually disappeared from his reports and the heading ‘labour’ in
the district reports began to refer to the labour situation within the district
itself.(& But, once again, other observations in the NC reports sources permit
an alternative interpretation. Although not viewing them as an indication of
the importance of circulatory migration, the NC Buhera also observed a
growing number of omnibuses operating in the district.(’ Buhera district was
no longer reduced to a mere labour reserve for the settler economy, but now
became ‘re-invented’ as ‘traditional’ rural African society, requiring state
intervention in order to develop. This image is also paramount in Holleman’s
study of Buhera. To Holleman, Buhera represents a typical farming society,
($ Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, 105. (% Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, 137–77.
(& NC Buhera annual reports 1940–61, NAZ S1563 ; S1051 ; S2827}2}2}1-8 ; S2403}
2681.
(’ The number of omnibuses linking Buhera to Enkeldoorn (Chivhu) rose from one in
1955 to fifteen in 1961. Furthermore, the NC Buhera observed that accumulated wealth
was invested in transport, ‘[p]rivate motor cars are often seen in the Reserve.
Unfortunately many of these are in poor condition and must cost their owners a lot of
money to keep them on the road’ : NC Buhera Annual report 1961, NAZ S2827}2}2}8,
Vol. 1 ; Annual report 1957, NAZ S2827}2}2}5, Vol. 1. See also J. A. Andersson, ‘Re-
interpreting the rural-urban connection: migration practices and socio-cultural
dispositions of Buhera workers in Harare’, Africa (forthcoming).
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Fig. 5. Some parameters of colonial state intervention: Miles of road
maintained, number of dams, boreholes, cattle dip-tanks and staff in Buhera
sub-district, 1926–61.
characterized by ‘the nhimbe, the collective work-and-beer party … [that is]
the pivot of all organised economic activity amongst the Mashona people’.((
In his writings there is no mention of the Buheran involvement in the
Southern African migrant labour economy, let alone discussion of its
consequences for the organization of agricultural labour. In line with the
dominant academic structural–functionalist paradigm of the time, Holleman
describes African social life as guided by a coherent system of customary
laws, not disrupted by outside influences. Hence, to planners in the colonial
administration, this explanation of ‘customary laws’ provided the back-
ground knowledge of African society required for the administration’s efforts
to modernize it.()
Unlike the 1920s and 1930s, when the colonial administration’s growing
preoccupation with African land use had little impact upon Buhera sub-
district, the 1940s witnessed a rapid expansion of state intervention. In 1943,
the sub-district was accorded a full Native Commissioner status, and after
the end of the Second World War its staff was increased substantially,
particularly in the sphere of agricultural and community extension. White
Land Development Officers (LDO) and African demonstrators’ implemen-
tation of soil conservation measures, centralization and the agricultural
demonstration programme started to affect the larger part of the southern
Sabi reserve. Roads were made, villages were laid out in lines, dams were
constructed, a stockbreeding centre was set up, demonstration centres were
established, and irrigation projects were initiated.(* Figure 5 gives an
overview of this expanding state intervention.
Doubtless, the state’s development efforts were, as in the 1930s, motivated
partly by the need to increase the carrying capacity of the Sabi reserve for
(( Holleman, African Interlude, 16 ; Holleman, Shona Customary Law, 10–11.
() See also note 8.
(* For instance, a large irrigation project (Devuli or Devure irrigation scheme) was set
up in the south-eastern end of the district in the 1940s, and another small one near
Murambinda in 1956.
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another planned influx of Africans evicted from alienated lands elsewhere.)!
Yet, the effort of the state to enhance African farmers’ food production in the
increasingly crowded reserves)" could sometimes be in conflict with the
conservationist policy discourse underpinning other interventions in African
agriculture. According to the NC Buhera, who recognized this tension, soil
conservation could not be enforced by state regulation:
The Natives are exhorted to grow more food. This would be justified if all the
Natives followed modern methods of cultivation and observed even the rudi-
mentary principles of soil conservation but alas! the majority do not do so … To
contend that legislation will curb the ignorant native in his destructive ways is mere
wishful thinking. The only solution is to drop the price of grain and reduce the
profits allowed to the grain trader. This should discourage the Native from
cultivating to excess and the grain trader from making excessive profits.)#
Although the late 1950s seem to have produced more colonial reports on the
Buhera area than all preceding periods together,)$ the categories of thought
produced and the impact of policies such as the Native Land Husbandry Act
of 1951 have to be critically examined. These policies considered Buhera to
be a farming area from which people without farming and grazing rights
could, and would, be excluded. They were to be absorbed in the urban sector
of the economy. The colonial reports show no understanding of existing land
and cattle ownership arrangements or of the relative importance of labour
migration, cultivation and cattle in people’s livelihoods.)% The information
gathered served a legal–technical planning exercise that may have had little
bearing on actual local situations.
Agricultural modernization: the impact of the NLHA in Buhera
In the early 1990s, Ian Phimister suggested that the impact of the NLHA
may have been overestimated in Zimbabwean historiography. Not only did
the implementation of the act progress slowly and meet with enormous
protest, but it did not cause massive landlessness or the end of entrepreneurial
farming in the reserves. As he argued, a ‘large number of better-off peasants
came through the Land Husbandry Act, if not unscathed, then more or less
intact’. Hence, Phimister suggested that the NLHA did not end independent
African peasant production or diminish peasant differentiation, contending
that it ‘is a moot point whether the implementation of the Land Husbandry
)! As is evidenced by the remark, ‘The rate of absorption of population is dependant
entirely on the provision, firstly, of water by boreholes and wells’ : NC Buhera to
Provincial NC Gwelo on the removal of natives from European areas, 16 Aug. 1950, NAZ
S2588}2004.
)" Buhera was one of the target areas of the state’s Food Production Drive (FPD) policy
in the early 1950s : Correspondence and reports FPD policy 1951–4, NAZ S160 AGR 4
Mar. 1951 and S160 AGR 3}1E}52.
)# NC Buhera, annual report 1952, NAZ S2403}2681.
)$ Assessment reports NLHA Buhera 1953–1961, NAZ S2808}1}5.
)% See also G. K. Garbett, ‘The Land Husbandry Act of Southern Rhodesia’, in D.
Biebuyck (ed.), African Agrarian Systems (Oxford, 1963), 185–202.
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Act accelerated the process of proletarianisation or merely certified its
existent’.)&
In Buhera, equally, where people became wealthier in the early 1950s,
protest against the NLHA was substantial. Destocking, resulting in the
compulsory sale of thousands of cattle in the late 1950s, was widely
resented.)’ The ploy of Buhera stock owners to reduce the impact of the act
by redistributing stock among family members exposed the flawed as-
sumption of individual stock ownership among the architects of the de-
stocking policy. The impact of this policy was further reduced by the fact
that the stock regulations (enforced at the cattle dip-tanks) were never
followed up, diminishing the long-term impact of the NLHA on the cattle
sector. Evasions of the stock regulations, on the other hand, became firmly
institutionalized as a result of the Act.)(
Opposition to land allocation under the Land Husbandry Act was mainly
confined to the better-watered, northern part of Buhera. In Chief Chitsunge’s
area (Figure 1) opposition was so strong that government officials carried
weapons when visiting the area. In other areas, however, opposition was
minimal, while in the southern parts of the district the act was never
implemented.)) The impact of the NLHA was further reduced by the fact
that in many areas of the district, ample land was available for allocation. The
NC Buhera allocated such land, and it was even applied for by absent men
working in towns or on farms.)* Hence, the rural and urban class formation
envisaged by the Act never materialized, as Buhera migrant workers did not
become landless. Not surprisingly then, opposition to the Act was not always
directed towards land allocation per se, as a letter in the African Weekly
reveals :
We appreciate land allocation but in our case, there is … [so shortly before the
rainy season] no time now for us to prepare and plough fields. We would be pleased
if we could be allowed to use our former fields for this year, and allocation could
continue after the next harvest, or we will starve.*!
Land allocations, once made, also proved difficult to enforce with Buhera
office’s limited administrative capacity. People extended their plots, forcing
government to make the concession of allowing plot extensions, provided
that farmers dug contour ridges on these lands. Furthermore, those who had
not been allocated land initially (because of their youth) were given some
later, causing the issue of land rights to continue up to the early 1970s.
)& Phimister, ‘Rethinking the reserves: Southern Rhodesia’s Land Husbandry Act
reviewed’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 19 (1993), 237.
)’ In the period 1956–60, each year more than 7,500 cattle were sold against the 1,500
to 4,000 per year in the period 1940–55. The only exception is the drought year 1947,
when more than 6,000 cattle are reported to have been sold: NC Buhera annual reports
1940–61.
)( Even in the 1990s the Veterinary Department has few clues about the number of
stock in the district. )) Personal communication, Mr. C. J. K. Latham.
)* See NC Buhera to Provincial NC Midlands on NLHA 1951, 3 Mar. 1955, NAZ,
S2808}1}5, as quoted in J. A. Andersson, ‘The politics of land scarcity: land disputes in
Save communal area, Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 25 (1999), 563.
*! W. M. Manhera, ‘May Buhera land allocation please be postponed: it is too late
now’, African Weekly, 23 Oct. 1960, 14.
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Consequently, designated divisions between grazing, residential and arable
areas became blurred. Hence, the practice of land allocation diverged
substantially from the Act’s intentions and the administrative order found
in the archives.
To conclude, the 1950s were undoubtedly a period in which the colonial
state’s presence was most strongly felt in Zimbabwe’s rural areas, including
Buhera district. However, the wealth of archival material, and the rural
interventions which the Act produced, should not lead to an overestimation
of its effectiveness. Categories of thought produced by the Act, such as
individual land and stock ownership, were in practice more fluid than
initially envisaged, and therefore easily manipulated. This is not to say that
the overall impact of the Act was limited, but rather that local differences in
interpretation, implementation and appropriation (by administrators and
local peoples) determined its short-term and long-term outcomes. In
Buhera, the cattle sector suffered immediate losses, but crop production
continued without much disruption. The re-organization of land use had
virtually no negative impact on people’s access to land. Rather, it was the
opposite; the practice of sub-dividing large villages into independent smaller
units during theAct’s implementation enabled established immigrant families
to found their own independent villages. Thus, for a large number of people,
the claim to land was strengthened rather then diminished.*"
the loss of control and understanding : the last two
decades of settler rule
The scale of colonial state intervention in African reserves in the late 1950s
was unprecedented in many areas of Southern Rhodesia, including Buhera.
Never before had the lives of the inhabitants of the sub-district been so
directly affected by the colonial administration’s policies. These inter-
ventions were, however, short-lived. The implementation of the Native
Land Husbandry Act met with widespread African opposition and sabotage.
Protest against the Act was, in fact, so widespread that the government
decided not to prosecute offenders. As the NC Buhera complained, ‘With
lack of staff … and with the instruction not to prosecute offenders under the
Act, control is fast being lost and will be very difficult to regain should we
wish to do so’.*#
These words reflect not only the perceived idea of the official that they
were in control, but are also visionary for the opinion of his successor in the
1970s. For, in the last two decades of its rule, the settler state gradually lost
all control over the Buhera area and its people; in effect, it relinquished the
control it had largely gained in the 1940s and 1950s. As part of an emerging
policy discourse of decentralized community-based development of the
African reserves, the legal position of local-level and traditional authorities
strengthened. In Buhera, this policy of African self-government progressed
slowly and did not seem to function well. When, in the mid-1970s, guerrillas
*" Thus, the NLHA fits into the long-term processes of segmentation and political
struggle between communities as described by Beach, A Zimbabwean Past, 36–43 ;
Holleman, The Pattern of Hera Kinship (London, Rhodes-Livingstone Papers, 1949) ;
Andersson, ‘The politics’, 553–78.
*# NC Buhera annual report 1963(?), NAZ, S2808}1}1, Vol. 2.
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started to penetrate the Buhera territory, the District Commissioner (DC)*$
at Buhera realized that the government had no control over the area:
The position is, briefly, that the first terrorist incursions into this district
occurred on the 6th of July 1976. Due to lack of staff, vehicles, weapons and
equipment it was impossible to get into the affected areas. Army coverage here has
been minimal and sporadic … I realise that this is a pretty sorry state of affairs, but
in the past 12 months I have lost one European and 6 African members of staff
killed in action or murdered by ters [terrorists]. I am not prepared to lose more in
taking unnecessary risks.*%
Still, despite evidence to the contrary, the image of Buhera as representing
the traditional, agriculture-based African society was firmly rooted in the
mind of its District Commissioner. Unlike his predecessors in the early
colonial period who could observe discrepancies between labour policy and
practice, this District Commissioner did not recognize the increased
significance of labour circulation between Buhera and Salisbury.*& Although
his administrative tasks would have enabled him to observe the importance
of rural–urban ties, stereotypical thinking dominated.*’ In a letter to J. F.
Holleman, who enquired about the importance of labour migrancy, he wrote,
‘I regret there are no figures available … however, all DC’s in the past have
reported on the reluctance of the tribesmen in the Buhera district to seek
employment outside the Buhera district and this continues today’*(. Never-
theless, a survey held in 1969 revealed that there were at least four bus
companies providing no fewer than seven bus services a day to Salisbury
alone.*) Buhera livelihoods, which were already firmly incorporated into the
Southern African migrant economy in the early colonial period, had now
become firmly tied to the urban economy of Salisbury.**
challenging the notion of the hegemonic colonial state
in zimbabwe
The historical analysis of Buhera sub-district presented in this article adds
to a growing body of literature which stresses the relative weakness of the
colonial state in Africa. Focusing on its limited resources, on its internal
*$ With a departmental reorganization of the state apparatus in 1962, Native Com-
missioners were renamed District Commissioners: Government Notice No. 514 (16 Nov.
1962).
*% DC Buhera to Secretary African Development Fund, 2 Feb. 1978, NAZ records
centre Mutare, ACC 16}22}2}78. Guerrillas had penetrated the area at least two years
earlier. The little-patrolled district was used to hide weapons and served to prepare for
guerrilla actions.
*& In the early 1960s, the Tax Advice Forms were abolished; this way of tax collection
from absent migrant labourers was considered to be too expensive. Consequently,
District Commissioners lost the sole administrative practice providing them with insight
into oscillating labour migration from the districts : personal communication, Mr.
C. J. K. Latham. See also note 47.
*’ For instance, requests to the District Commissioner for compensation from the
workmen’s compensation fund reveal numerous cases of injured and killed migrant
workers from Buhera in the late 1960s : DC Buhera LABOUR 4, 1967–9, NAZ record
centre, box 11948.
*( NC Buhera to. J. F. Holleman, 2 Oct. 1972, NAZ records centre, box 119147.
*) Community Advisors’ reports 1968–72, NAZ records centre, box 119148.
** J. A. Andersson, ‘Re-interpreting the rural–urban’.
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conflicts of interest and on the contradictory processes that shaped such
states, this literature has challenged the ‘hegemonic state’ perspective in
African historiography."!! In examining the categories of thought produced
by the colonial state, the present discussion has emphasized another aspect
of the hegemonic colonial-state picture. It has sought to show how the state’s
own sources provide for an interpretation in which the settler state plays a far
less dominant role in directing social change than has been often assumed in
Zimbabwean historiography. This, of course, raises the problematic question
of the uniqueness of the Buhera case in Zimbabwe’s colonial history. Such
a question is not easily answered. The limited sources available on Buhera
could also be used to construct a historical narrative that stresses the colonial
state’s control. Yet, as the analysis presented here has shown, colonial
officers’ reports often presented an order that, in reality, was far more
complex and therefore difficult to control. If a similar perspective is adopted,
it may well be found that colonial records on other areas also allow for a less
hegemonic interpretation of the role of the colonial state in directing
historical developments. Other sources, not originating from the colonial
administration, may also be more useful for such reinterpretation, as current
historical research continues to be biased towards the colonial state’s archival
materials. Ranger, for one, has recognized this problem explicitly, explaining
that he ‘first identified a district in Matabeleland for which there seemed to
be a great deal of archival material’."!" Thus, he elaborates on his selection
of Matobo district in southern Matabeleland, the research setting of his
monograph, Voices from the Rocks. Ranger sought a district ‘to compare and
contrast’ with Makoni district, the main focus of his earlier study, Peasant
Consciousness and Guerrilla War, which so convincingly rectified the passive
role attributed to African farmers in Zimbabwean historiography. He
recognized that the Makoni district ‘was unusual because conditions there
were particularly favourable to African peasant production’."!# The Buhera
district is another example of such an ‘unusual’ district, albeit not for its
favourable agricultural environment. The lack of settler interference in the
area and, related to this, the limited colonial records that were produced on
it, have caused the area to be one of those reserves on which little more than
administrative data exists.
It is ironic to take the work of Ranger as an example to suggest that
Zimbabwean historiography has perhaps been too much focused on those
areas where Africans were in direct confrontation with white settlers – for
which ample archive material is available. For, years previously, Ranger
himself warned against a heavy reliance on the colonial state’s archival
material. In a review article on Palmer and Parsons’ classic book, The Roots
of Rural Poverty, he argued:
There is certainly a good case to be made for the priority of archival
sources … [However,] a book so dependent on colonial documentation is bound to
argue that the colonial impact constituted the crucial event in peasantization’."!$
Furthermore, it was Ranger who made a case for the role of social actors from
"!! Berry, ‘Hegemony’; Berman and Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley.
"!" Ranger, Voices, 1. "!# Ranger, Peasant Consciousness ; Ranger, Voices, 1.
"!$ T. Ranger, ‘Growing from the roots : reflections on peasant research in Central and
Southern Africa’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 5 (1978), 107.
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below in shaping protest against the colonial state. Thus, he went beyond the
perspective of suppressed peasant initiative as put forward mainly by
historians of political economy schools of thought. A focus on areas where
Africans where not so much in direct confrontation with white settlers, as
was the case in Buhera, may shed a different light on the relationship between
colonial state policy and African protest. Not only may this result in a more
regionally differentiated view of popular protest against the colonial state and
the support for this struggle in rural areas."!% It may also result in additional
and newer interpretations of the roots of resistance against the colonial state.
Such interpretations may focus less on land issues but would pay, for
example, more attention to the grievances of Africans running up against the
racial policies of the colonial state which were hampering their upward
mobility in society.
"!% For instance, Kriger has argued that in Mutoko district, guerrillas often lacked
peasant popular support. She claims that guerrilla coercion is underestimated in the study
of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, arguing that the evidence of popular support rests on
inferences rather than on peasant accounts: N. J. Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War:
Peasant Voices (Cambridge, 1992), 238.
